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Only in office since the beginning of February, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti
did not survive a motion of no confidence in late March. Instead of calling new
elections, the President of the Republic has been working towards forming a new
government, invoking his right to propose a Prime Minister. This move, however, has
no basis in the constitution, and the Constitutional Court is expected to clarify the
matter any day.
How the pandemic has exacerbated a political crisis
Dealing with the COVID 19 pandemic has raised constitutional issues in many
countries. In the Republic of Kosovo, the dispute over the questions of how to deal
with the pandemic ended with a motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Albin
Kurti, who has only been in office since the 3 February 2020. Kurti decided not to
declare a state of emergency at the very beginning of the pandemic but nevertheless
established a nationwide curfew, while the President, Hashim Thaçi, and the Minister
of the Interior, Veliu, insisted on declaring a state of emergency because Kurti’s
measures were unconstitutional.
Kurti feared a loss of institutional power to the president during a state of emergency.
This would have occurred at a precarious time, when an institutional power struggle
was taking place anyway between the office of the President and the Prime Minister.
For weeks, the two have been arguing about the maintenance of a 100% customs
tariff against Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Corona crisis was therefore used for an institutional power struggle, against
which the population protested loudly from their balconies.
A Prime Minister with no confidence
According to Art. 100 No. 1 of the Kosovar constitution (KC), 1/3 of all deputies,
i.e. 41 deputies, can initiate a motion of no confidence. It will, however, only be
successful if the deputies vote for it by an absolute majority (i.e. 61 votes out of 120).
Kurti was voted out of the parliament with 82 votes for, 32 against, and 1 abstention.
Kurti and his party Vetëvendosje! (VV) insist on new elections. Thaçi instead used
his right to propose a new Prime Minister according to Art. 95 KC and form a new
government. He initially consulted VV, as the winners of the 2019 Parliamentary
elections, for the proposal of a new Prime Minister candidate. After five such
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consultations between 02 April 2020 and 22 April 2020, and no proposal from
VV, Thaçi proceeded to consult LDK as the party that could possibly provide a
candidate who could get the majority in parliament. They nominated Hoti (deputy
Prime Minister in the Kurti government) as candidate for a new Prime Minister,
and on 30 April 2020 VV filed a constitutional complaint against Thaçi’s decree to
propose Hoti as Prime Minister. The Constitutional Court is expected to clarify by 29
May 2020 whether the President’s course of action is legally permissible and a new
government can be elected, or whether early parliamentary elections should be held.
It will have to deal with a number of questions regarding the extent of the President’s
right to propose a Prime Minister.
No elections, no right of proposal
Kosovo’s Constitution does not specify the procedure after a successful motion
of no confidence. Therefore, proponents of the possibility for President Thaçi to
seek a new Prime Minister and not to dissolve Parliament invoke the President’s
right of proposal. This right is laid down in Art. 95 KC and, according to some, also
applies after a successful motion of no confidence. This interpretation, however, may
be questioned: Art. 95 KC does not address the motion of no confidence but only
describes how the government shall be formed after a parliamentary election.
Art. 95 No. 1 KC gives the President the right and obligation to consult the party/
coalition which has obtained the majority in Parliament. As early as 2014, the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo had to deal with the question of
which party/coalition should be consulted first by the President for the search of
a Prime Minister candidate: the party/coalition that obtained the most votes in the
parliamentary elections or the party/coalition that can obtain the most votes in
parliament?
Contrary to the wording of Art. 95 No. 1 KC, the Court ruled that the first party to
be consulted by the President is the party/coalition that obtained the majority of
votes in the parliamentary elections. The President should only have a second right
to propose another candidate if the first proposed candidate does not receive the
majority of votes in Parliament. The Constitutional Court decided that in the context
of the second right of proposal, the President is no longer limited to consulting with
the winner of the parliamentary elections but can decide the party/coalition out of
which the next candidate can be proposed. He must make sure, though, that a
candidate is proposed who is able to obtain the majority of votes in parliament.
However, in the case of Kurti, the question remains open on whether the President’s
right of proposal is also applicable in the event of a successful motion of no
confidence.
No confidence is not “any other reason”
According to Art. 95 No. 5 KC, the incumbent government ceases in the event of the
resignation of the Prime Minister, or if for any other reason his post becomes vacant.
- 2 -
This in turn leads to the President having the right to propose a new Prime Minister,
but only in consultation with the party that has the majority of votes in parliament.
This was evidenced in the application of Art. 95 No. 5 KC in 2019, following the
resignation of former Premier Minister Haradinaj.
However, the applicability of Art. 95 No. 5 KC appears questionable: The wording of
Art. 95 No. 5 KC refers to the resignation of the Prime Minister, but not to a motion
of no confidence. According to the object and purpose of the regulation, it can be
assumed that other cases are meant to be regulated, such as a conviction of the
Prime Minister or his death. But even if one was to assume that Art. 95 No. 5 KC is
applicable, it only establishes a single procedure for the nomination of a candidate
for the office of Prime Minister. There is no reference to the upper paragraphs and
thus neither to Art. 95 No. 4 KC which establishes the second right of proposal on
the part of the President after the failure of the first attempt to form a government.
This would mean that Thaçi, according to the wording of the provision, did not have
the right to consult with any other party when VV rejected failed to suggest a new
candidate. As a result, new elections could be held, as happened in the case of
Haradinaj in 2019.
Dissolution as solution
With Art. 95 KC being inapplicable in the current situation, Art. 82 No. 2 KC becomes
relevant. This provision concerns all cases of parliamentary dissolution and states:
“The Assembly may be dissolved by the President of the Republic
of Kosovo following a successful vote of no confidence against the
Government.”
Consequently, the President does not necessarily have to dissolve the parliament
after a successful motion of no confidence.
The President might not dissolve the Assembly, for example, if there is a consensus
within parliament for the election of a new Prime Minister. Such a government,
however, can only be understood as a transitional government until new elections.
A comparison can be made with the Austrian government crisis in 2019, as the
Austrian constitution, too, only provides a destructive motion of no confidence.
After the successful motion of no confidence against the Kurz government in May
2019, a transitional government was elected and was entrusted with the duties of
government until new elections were held at the end of 2019, pursuant to Art. 71, 74
of the Federal Constitutional Law Austria. In the case of the Kurti government, due to
the lack of consensus among all parties, new elections are probably inevitable.
It is noteworthy that in 2017, in the event of a successful motion of no confidence
against the Mustafa government, on the same day Thaçi as President of
the Republic dissolved parliament and new elections were announced. The
interpretation of Art. 95 KC in that situation fits with the author’s analysis in this
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article. What led to Thaçi’s change of mind this time around, however, remains
unclear.
The case for a constructive motion of no confidence
Repetitive premature new elections weaken the people’s confidence in a stable
government. There have already been four premature elections since Kosovo gained
its independence in 2008. The political power struggle of various political actors
deliberately exploits the weaknesses of the constitution and leads to even less
trust of the population in the democratic system. Thought should therefore be given
to a constitutional amendment to change the destructive motion of no confidence
into a constructive one, as, for example, in Germany, and to raise the quorum for
initiating the motion of no confidence to an absolute majority of the members of
parliament. There are certainly lessons to be learned from the complications that
arose out of the destructive motion of no confidence: After all, everyone knows that
constructive criticism is always better than destructive and so should be the motion
of no confidence.
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